

10 November 1980

Note for DDCI

SUBJECT: Possible Subjects for Transition Briefings ☐

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1. During the transition we will be dealing, in a variety of forms, with different people and on differing subject matter during the next few weeks and months. You and the Director will be meeting with Ed Meese and others on Thursday; we will have to address the subject of getting the PDB and other intelligence information to the President-elect; there will presumably be briefings of the President-elect sometime next week; there will likely be others to follow; and there will be briefings that will be given to members of the transition team. ☐

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2. In whatever we do we will be dealing essentially with two kinds of material: substantive (analytic) briefings; and briefings on subjects of a more operational and/or procedural nature. Regardless of which type we are talking about it seems that one can differentiate between those topics and issues that the new administration should focus on immediately (where a crisis or critical situation exists now) and those which are more fundamental to the national security concerns/might produce crises later. Therefore, I would like to offer something along the following lines for your consideration. ☐

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3. Issues of More Immediate Concern.

a. Topics for substantive (analytic) briefings.

- Poland. This would stress the inherent dilemma of the Polish leadership's acceding to the workers' demands as it adversely affects the leadership's ability to correct Poland's grave economic problems. It would address such questions as whether the Polish regime will continue along its present conciliatory path (how long can the regime afford to continue this approach?); the reliability of Poland's security and military forces; how long the Soviet and other EE states will allow the Polish government to muddle along; and Soviet (and other EE states) capabilities for military intervention. It would note the paradox that both the West and Poland's CEMA allies have vested economic interests in seeing the regime crack down.

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- Iran-Iraq War. This would essentially be an update of the briefing given in early October. It would emphasize the increasing likelihood of a pointless but dangerous war of attrition due to the difficulty of inducing the Iraqi and Iranian regimes to engage in meaningful negotiations; the impact of prolonged hostilities on the export of oil and on the division of the Arab world into pro- and anti-Iraqi camps; and the effect of continued hostilities on US policies and posture in the Near East--both pro and con.
- Iran (Internal Developments). This briefing would deal with the evolution of the Islamic Revolution of Khomeini, the challenges it faces both from within and without, and how we see Iran as a regional actor in the next few years. Specifically it would treat of the various centers of power, the key actors (including exiles), the religious and ethnic realities, and the prospects for both the survival of the Islamic Revolution and for an increased Soviet role. Finally, this briefing would touch on the hostage situation, how this affects US ability to influence events and what are possible US options when the crisis is resolved.
- Afghanistan. This would include an assessment of how the insurgency is going, Soviet options, prospects for continued vitality of the insurgency and the effect of the situation on US policy in Southwest Asia. In this briefing it would be important to stress the role of Pakistan and the effect of Pakistan's support for the insurgency on the internal situation that Zia faces.
- Central America. This would cover the current situation in Nicaragua and El Salvador with some background as to how they got where they are today plus their immediate prospects. Treating this would have to include the Cuban role as well as the situation/involvement of other players (Guatemala, Honduras). Included would be an understanding of the common problem the US faces with regard to support for "weak" centrist regimes versus acceptance of the repressive right or revolutionary-Marxist left. Common societal and economic problems key to the success of any government should be highlighted.
- Ethiopia-Somalia. This would include a discussion of the endemic nature of the conflict, the extent of Soviet and Cuban presence in and support to Ethiopia, Siad's need to continue the conflict for both offensive and defensive reasons, and the "Revolution of

Rising Expectations" caused by the US-Somali agreement. It would address the question of whether Ethiopian aggressiveness or Somali ineptitude in the Ogaden will lead Siad Barre to press the US for military support. It should, as well, treat the internal insurgencies in Ethiopia and how this affects/influences their posture vis-a-vis Somalia.

- Southeast Asia. This would focus on the likelihood that Vietnam will, during the current dry season, engage Thai forces in raids against democratic Kampuchean forces and that, as a result, the Thai might invoke the Manila Pact or that China might respond. It would include an analysis of Vietnam's need to bring the war in Kampuchea to a close; the various pressures for, and prospects of, any political solution; the results of China's attempt to teach Vietnam a lesson and the probability that the Chinese would attempt a second lesson; the growing Soviet presence in Vietnam; and an assessment as to whether in the event of another Chinese attack on Vietnam the Soviets would limit their support to diplomatic measures and modest military resupply efforts.

b. Other subjects.

- Key CIA Budgetary Issues. This would summarize the need for both CA funding and the adequate funding of the overall Reserve. Included herein would be the treatment of slots.
- NFIP Funding Level. This would address the DCI's budget decisions prepared under the current guidance. However, given that there is talk of both a supplemental for FY 81 and a later substantial increase for FY 82 in the DoD budget, it might be worthwhile to lay out how a commensurate or proportional increase in NFIP funding might be used.

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4. Other, less urgent, subjects.

a. Topics for substantive (analytic) briefings.

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
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- China. This would highlight the question of whether the present regime, aided and abetted by trade/aid with the West, will be able to build up the country's economic and military power within the next 5 to 10 years to the extent that it will become an effective counterweight to the USSR and Vietnam in Asia (and the effect of this on any Japanese military buildup). It would discuss the prospects for China's continued stability; the likelihood of a rapprochement with the USSR borne out of Chinese weakness or possibly a change in Soviet policy; the probability that China will be able to put foreign technology into use effectively; and the Chinese ability to pay for much of the technology they will need.
 - Africa. This would include a general, brief treatment of key countries and issues likely to continue to involve the US (in part due rise of expectations in US role due emphasis in past four years). Political/economic/security issues in the following countries are possible: Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Kenya, Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda, South Africa/Namibia.
 - Cuba. This would be a comprehensive view of the country, its messianic leadership and revolutionary aims in the Third World. It would include treatment of its economic strengths, weaknesses and dependency on the USSR; its overall relationship with the USSR in political and military spheres; and the role it plays in the NAM. It would also discuss Cuba's foreign involvement in Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America.
 - Economic Issues. This could be broken down into a series of briefings dealing with the following: world energy situation; world food situation; and major economic factors affecting the West, the Bloc and the LDCs. These briefings would deal with the basic issues of supply and demand and how these realities will affect the actions of the major actors on the world scene.
 - Soviet Military Capabilities. This would essentially be a preview of 11-3/8 and 11-14. It would address Soviet strategic and tactical capabilities now and in

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the next few years and would attempt to compare these capabilities against those of the US. But it would also address Soviet perceptions (what drives them) and their domestic strengths and weaknesses (technology, demography, etc.).

b. Other subjects.

- Covert Action. This would be a comprehensive briefing on what CA programs have been undertaken in the last four years and where we stand on each of them (the revised Biweekly CA Update book that should be available this week could well provide the basis of this briefing). Included in this would be problems we have had in dealing with the Hill.
- NSC Process. This would provide a rundown on the pros and cons of the current way of doing business via the SCC/PRC, both for special activities and policy matters.
- Executive Order 12036 Issues. This, like the foregoing, would provide an opportunity to discuss how we function under the current Executive Order and what problems might be worth redressing.
- Miscellaneous Items. This would include a discussion of such issues as CIAP, FOIA, leaks, charters, etc.



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